*mental intuition* and *ocular vision* shows that one can neither distinctly intuit nor clearly see many things simultaneously; on the contrary, one must eliminate distractions and concentrate on the simplest and easiest matters. Many have a preference for obscurity over clarity, but those who know recognize the truth equally easily whether they have educed it from a clear and simple subject or from an obscure and complicated one. *In a display of blindness toward the diversity of the forms that knowledge and evidence can and must assume, it is said that one is not to think that one knows what one does not intuit as distinctly as what one knows most distinctly – thus setting the standard of evidence so high that much of what is legitimately taken to be knowledge could not possibly meet it.* It is stressed that the sciences are deduced, not from obscure and complicated matters, but from clear and simple ones, as in the case of the question whether a natural power can instantaneously move from place to place through a medium. Another example is that of causes with opposite effects, making for an abrupt conclusion. *Therefore the question is how to render intuition as perspicacious as possible – but, perhaps, without necessarily demanding that all intuition be as perspicacious as that intuition which is as perspicacious as possible.*

*According to Rule 10*, one should, in order to render the natural intelligence sagacious, exercise it in regard to both the important discoveries and the trivial artifices of other human beings, especially in regard to those which are ordered. *The focus shifts from perspicacity of intuition to sagacity of deduction.* A good way to develop sagacity of deduction is said to be to practice discovering reasons on one's own instead of listening to others' reasonings. The essence of sagacity is located in the proper observance of the various orders of different things. Not *luck*, but *art*, is identified as the key to solving problems. The precepts of the dialecticians warrant omission because it is impossible to arrive at cogent conclusions without evident inferences. *Dialectic* is placed, not in *philosophy*, but in *rhetoric*, because dialectical syllogisms do not discover any new knowledge, but rather only explain the old. *Therefore the question is how to render deduction as sagacious as possible – yet, once again, perhaps, without necessarily requiring that all deduction be as sagacious as that deduction which is as sagacious as possible.*

*According to Rule 11*, one should, in case one wants to draw any other conclusions from some simple propositions once intuited, increase the capacity of the natural intelligence as much as possible, and one should do this by running through the simple propositions in a continuous and uninterrupted movement of thought, by reflecting on their mutual relations, and by distinctly conceiving several of them together. *The focus shifts from sagacity of deduction to capacity of inference.* So the relationships between *intuition*, *deduction*, and *induction* do need further clarification. For, once again, *simple and perspicuous deduction* appears to amount to *intuition*, whereas *multifaceted and complex deduction* seems to amount to *induction*. While intuition and induction cooperate so closely that they seem to coalesce into a single operation, what role is left for deduction to play? The lame recommendation is, still, to strengthen *the weak and unstable memory* by means of *a continuous movement of thought*. This continuous movement of thought is supposed to emend the sluggishness of the natural intelligence and to amplify its capacity, which the example of numbers in continuous proportion illustrates. *Therefore the question is how to render inference as capable as possible – but, one last time, perhaps, without demanding that all inference be as capable as that inference which is as capable as possible.*

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*According to Rule 12*, one should – in order to intuit simple propositions distinctly, to recognize things unknown by correctly comparing them with things known, and to do so in such a way as to omit nothing of which human industry is capable – employ all the aids of the intellect, of the imagination, of the senses, and of the memory. *The argument is that there is one identical natural intelligence which manifests itself in many different manners*. So the natural intelligence is understood, not in a narrow sense as *the intellect individually*, but in the broad sense as *the cognitive capacities collectively*. Once again, the two cognitive factors are said to be *those who know* and *the things which are to be known*. *Under Aspect 1*, the first cognitive factor, namely, those who know, is analyzed. *The human being* is apprehended as *a composite of mind and of body*. The intention is to give the most coherent description of the cognitive faculties. *First*, the *external senses*, all parts of the body, passively receive an impression of the shape of the perceived object. In an anticipation of the architectonic argument of the *Regulæ*, it is suggested that the universal role of shape in sensible things presents the possibility of expressing all differences in sensible things in terms of shape. *Second*, the stimulation of an external sense by the figure of a perceived object is transmitted to the *common sense*, also a part of the body. *Third*, the common sense forms in the *imagination* or in the *fantasy*, another part of the body, the figures from the external senses, and, in so far as the fantasy retains these ideas, it is called '*memory*'. *Fourth*, the fantasy is located in the *brain*, in which the motive force of the *nerves* originates, and the fantasy moves the nerves as the external senses do the common sense. *Fifth*, the *same cognitive power* performs *different operations*, for example, sensing, imagining, remembering, and understanding; but it is defined as 'natural intelligence', in the proper sense, in so far as it forms new ideas in the fantasy or gets involved with those already made. If the intellect is not engaged with something corporeal, then it cannot use the senses or the imagination or the (corporeal) memory; if it is, then it must represent it as concisely and as precisely as possible. *Under Aspect 2*, the second cognitive factor, namely, the things which are to be known, is analyzed. The project is to differentiate *simple* and *composite things*, and to identify *certainty* and *falsity*. *First*, 'simple things' are defined as those things the knowledge of which is so perspicuous and so distinct that the mind cannot divide them into more things known more distinctly, for example, shape, extension, and motion. *Second*, these *simple things* are classified as *purely intellectual* (known by an innate intellectual light) or as *purely material* (recognized to be present only in bodies) or as *common* (ascribed to both bodies and spirits and known accordingly). Also, the *privations* and *negations* of the simple natures are themselves counted as simple natures. *Third*, the claim is that the simple natures are known per se and that they never contain any falsity. *Fourth*, the *conjunction* of these simple things is said to be either *necessary*, in which case they are inseparable, or *contingent*, in which case they are separable. *Fifth*, one is supposed to be able to understand nothing but these simple natures and their composition. *Sixth*, composite natures are said to be known either through one's own *experience* or through one's own *composition*. *Seventh*, *composition* is said to occur in *three ways*, namely, through *impulse* or through *conjecture* or through *deduction*. But deduction is described as the only fashion of composition which can be certainly veridical. *First*, evident intuition and necessary deduction do not appear to correspond without further ado to simple natures and to necessary

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